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Abstract—In this paper the electrical safety of DC urban
traction systems is analysed, with particular focus on fault
current detection and on dangerous voltages which could arise
in case of fault. For the discussion the tram network of Turin,
Italy, is used as a case study. Firstly the structure of the DC
traction power supply is described; then the safety of the system
is analysed, examining possible types of fault. In particular,
ground faults inside the substation and along the line are analysed
in detail. Fault currents and dangerous voltages are calculated
thanks to a simplified circuital model of the traction system.
Finally, the consequent risks for the people are examined and
some conclusions are presented.
I. INTRODUCTION
Urban DC traction systems are common mass transport
systems employed in many towns worldwide. The terminology
used to identify them may vary, the most common terms being:
light rail, street car, tram or trolley. We can consider these
terms as synonyms.
The Traction Electrification System (TES) for trams is
usually constituted by:
• power substations, containing transformers, AC/DC con-
verters and protective devices;
• an Overhead Contact System (OCS);
• positive feeder cables, connecting the OCS with the
positive busbars in the substations;
• negative return conductors, collecting the return current
from the rails and bringing it back to the negative busbar
in the substation.
It is worth noting that there is a huge difference between
these tram systems, running along public urban streets, in a
meshed network, and normal rail systems running on separate
rights of way, without public access and with mostly straight
sections [1]. In the former, in fact, the risk due to electric
hazards is higher because of the presence of the public in
strict contact with the TES, possibly exposed to dangerous
voltages in case of fault. In addition to this, the protection of
these systems is more difficult, due to the meshed structure of
the network and to the high number of vehicles running at the
same time.
The difficulty of protection of DC urban tram systems is
due to the problem of distinguishing a fault current from the
currents related to the normal operation, mainly because of
the following factors:
• fault currents can be small, due to high impedance ground
faults;
• in standard heavy rail systems the lines are divided in
straight sections, and in each section, for safety reasons,
only one train is allowed to run at the same time; in urban
tram systems, instead, the network is meshed, and also the
sections are meshed: more than one tram can be running
at the same time inside the same section, resulting in
higher currents in normal operation;
• the tram networks were designed for trams driven by DC
motors. Modern trams are instead driven by asynchronous
motors, fed by the DC OCS through IGBT DC/AC con-
verters; these trams have completely different absorbed
current profiles during acceleration and much higher peak
values.
For these reasons, using standard protection principles, such
as instantaneous and time-delayed over-current protections
is not sufficient. Different studies have been performed on
innovative protection schemes for TES [2], [3], but are mainly
focused on railway systems that, as said before, are quite
different from tram systems.
In Europe the main requirements for what concerns electri-
cal safety in traction systems are provided by Standards EN
50122-1 Railway applications - Fixed installations - Electrical
safety, earthing and the return circuit. Part 1: Protective
provisions against electric shock [4] and EN 50122-2 Railway
applications - Fixed installations - Electrical safety, earthing
and the return circuit. Part 2: Provisions against the effects of
stray currents caused by d.c. traction systems [5]. The main
problems covered in these Standards are:
• protective provisions against indirect contact and imper-
missible rail potential;
• stray currents and rail to earth conductance.
The two objectives of reducing both stray currents and
dangerous voltages in case of fault are contrasting, and the
results depend on the choices regarding the grounding of the
different elements of the TES [6], [7].
Object of this paper is the analysis of the electrical safety
of DC urban traction systems, with particular focus on fault
current detection and on the dangerous voltages which could
arise in case of fault. For the discussion the tram network of
Turin, Italy, is used as a case study.
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Fig. 1. Power substation for DC traction.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: firstly the
structure of the DC traction power supply is described, with
reference, in particular, to the Turin tram network; then the
safety of the system is analysed, examining possible types of
fault, fault currents, dangerous voltages and consequent risks
for the people. Finally some conclusions are presented.
II. STRUCTURE OF THE DC TRACTION POWER SUPPLY
Fig. 1 presents the typical scheme of a substation feeding the
DC traction system in Turin. MV cables connect the substation
to the rest of the urban MV distribution network. A double
secondary transformer lowers the voltage to 470 V and feeds
a 12 pulse rectifier. The output nominal voltage is 600V DC.
Each substation can feed 6 or 7 OCS zones: every zone is
fed through a positive cable and is protected by an extra-rapid
DC circuit breaker. The settings of the circuit breakers can
vary in the range between 3000A and 4500A, depending on
the size of the zone and on the forecasted number of vehicles
in it.
The negative cables allow the current return to the rectifier,
connecting it to the rails. While the OCS is divided in zones,
and each zone is fed by only one substation at a time, the
rails and negative cables constitute a unique meshed city-
wide network. The negative cables are not connected to
the substation grounding system, in order to limit the stray
currents dispersed by the rails into the ground.
In the tram network in Turin, the positive feeder and
negative cables have a typical cross section of 1000 mm2,
while the OCS has a cross section of 95mm2.
III. SAFETY OF DC TRACTION SYSTEMS
Different types of faults can happen on the DC urban rail
traction systems, among which (Fig. 2):
1) ground fault in the substation;
2) short circuit in the substation;
3) fault to a pole (to ground) along the line;
4) short circuit along the line (can happen on a vehicle);
5) ground fault along the line.
When a short circuit happens in the substation, the fault
current magnitude will be high enough to make the extra-
rapid circuit breaker trip. But in case the short circuit happens
TABLE I
RAIL TO GROUND CONDUCTANCE - MEASUREMENT RESULTS
Rail section Section length [m] g [S/km]
1 45 1.48
2 300 2.03
3 85 1.58
4 240 1.77
outside the substation, for example on a vehicle, or in case a
ground fault happens, the current would be limited by the
circuit resistances, resulting in a current comparable with
normal operation ones. In this case dangerous voltages can
last for long periods without any maximum current protection
intervention. For this reason new, and more sophisticated,
relays are being installed, and should be properly set in order
to recognize fault currents.
In general, the workers can be subject to risk of electric
shock inside the substation, and people outside the substation,
in case a fault is not recognized and interrupted in a time
interval shorter than that allowed by Standard EN 50122-1
(section 9.3.2.2 regarding the maximum permissible effective
touch voltages as a function of time duration) [4].
In this paper the focus is on ground fault inside the
substation (fault 1) and ground faults along the line (fault 5).
IV. CIRCUITAL MODEL OF THE TRACTION
ELECTRIFICATION SYSTEM
In order to study fault currents and dangerous voltages, a
simplified model of the TES has been developed, based on
literature review and on experimental measurements. In the
following sections the models for rails, rectifier and substation
grounding system are presented. Finally a simplified fault
circuit is described.
A. Rails model
Rails can be modelled as a distributed parameters line, with
a longitudinal resistance r and a shunt conductance to ground
g. For railway tracks with open formation, many studies report
typical values for the required parameters [8], [9]. For rails
with closed formation (typical of urban traction systems) a
few data can be gathered from literature. The longitudinal
parameter can be evaluated knowing the cross section of the
rails and the resistivity of the constitutive material. For the
rails in Turin, it was calculated r = 0.013 Ω/km. For what
concerns the conductance to ground, four measurements were
performed on short sections of rails, not used any more and
disconnected from the rest of the network: the results are
presented in Table I. The measured values, with an average
of g = 1.6 S/km, are compatible with the reference limit
value provided by Standard EN 50122-2 (g ≤ 2.5 S/km) [5].
For the study of the ground faults in the substation and along
the line, it is also important to evaluate the equivalent ground
resistance Rtg of all the city-wide tracks network; the rails
and negative cables constitute in fact, as previously described,
a unique meshed city-wide network. The value of Rtg changes
Fig. 2. Possible faults on DC traction systems.
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Fig. 3. Transformer-rectifier characteristic.
depending on the considered point and is difficult to evaluate.
It is however possible to estimate a range in which Rtg should
be included. For the purposes of this study, it was estimated
0.02 Ω ≤ Rtg ≤ 0.2 Ω.
B. Transformer and rectifier model
The model of the transformer and rectifier group has been
determined by means of an analytical study, experimental mea-
surements in a substation and numerical simulations (fig. 3).
In the case of ground faults, both in the substation and
along the line, the rectifier works in the first part of the
characteristic, with relatively high voltages and low currents.
As we are interested in the steady state condition and not
on the transient, and as the first part of the characteristic is
linear, the transformer/rectifier group has been modelled as an
equivalent voltage source Veq = 635 V in series connection
with an equivalent resistance Req = 0.0167 Ω.
C. Substation grounding system
The grounding system of the substations is constituted by
a typical configuration of a ring electrode with four rods. The
typical ground resistance can vary in the range from 5Ω to 15Ω
depending on the soil characteristics. However, the grounding
system of each substation is connected to the neighbouring
ones by means of the MV cables sheaths and, in Turin, of bare
conductors buried in contact with the soil together with MV
TABLE II
SUMMARY OF MODEL PARAMETERS
Parameter Value range
Veq 635 V
Req 0.0167 Ω
Rsg 0.06 Ω
Rtg 0.02 Ω ÷ 0.2 Ω
R− 1.7 · 10−4 Ω ÷ 1.7 · 10−3 Ω
R+ 1.7 · 10−4 Ω ÷ 1.7 · 10−3 Ω
Rocs 0 Ω ÷ 0.1 Ω
cables. For this reason, the equivalent ground resistance that
can be measured from each substation is mostly independent
from the ground resistance of the single substation and from
the distance between substations: it has a typical value around
Rsg = 0.06 Ω [10].
D. Fault circuit
Having defined the simplified models for the different
components of the system, it is possible to draw the equivalent
circuit for the ground fault in the substation or along the
line (Fig. 4). In the figure, R−, R+ and Rocs represent,
respectively, the resistance of the negative cables from the
substation to the rails, of the positive feeder cable from the
substation to the OCS and the resistance of the overhead line.
The ranges for the values of the different parameters are
summarized in Table II.
V. RESULTS
Currents and voltages have been calculated on the simplified
circuit, varying the different parameters in the ranges that have
been presented in the previous sections.
In the case of ground fault in the substation, the fault current
is injected into the ground through Rsg and flows through Rtg
and the negative conductors back to the rectifier. In the case of
ground fault along the line, instead, the fault current flows to
the ground through the fault and flows back to the substation
through the ground resistance of the rails network Rtg , without
involving the grounding system of the substation. It was
noticed that the value of the current absorbed by vehicles (i.e.
the pre-fault condition) does not affect considerably the results
Fig. 4. Fault circuit.
of the study. The same remarks are valid for the length of
the negative and positive cables: the variation of the value of
R− and R+ does not affect considerably the results. The main
parameters which instead influence the fault current magnitude
and the voltages are the resistance Rtg of the rails network and
the resistance Rocs of the OCS.
In Fig. 5 a summary of the results for the ground fault in
the substation is presented. The fault current can be compared
with the settings of the over-current protection to see if it
will trip: typical settings of over-current protections are in the
range from 3000A to 4500A, marked with the green vertical
lines in Fig. 5. On the left side of the vertical lines the circuit
breaker trips, while on the right side it does not, as it does
not recognize the fault current, leaving dangerous voltages
on the exposed conductive parts (ECPs) and between ECPs
and return conductors in the substation. Dangerous voltages
are also present on the rails, accessible to the public. The
conventional limit of 120 V for long-term conditions (to be
considered if the circuit breaker does not recognize the fault)
is in fact highlighted in the figure with the horizontal red line
and for all the range of possible values of Rtg the analysed
voltages are above this limit.
Also the ground fault along the line has been studied. Two
different cases are analysed: a ground fault along the line
near the substation and a ground fault along the line far from
the substation. In particular in the second case, the resistance
of the OCS contributes to the limitation of the fault current,
making it difficult for the over-current protection to recognize
the fault. The two analysed cases are presented in fig. 6 and
fig. 7.
Following the same scheme described before for the ground
fault in the substation, we have highlighted also in fig. 6 and
fig. 7 the typical setting range of the over-current protections
(green vertical lines) and the maximum permissible effective
touch voltage (horizontal red line). In the case of fault along
the line, the fault currents are higher than in the case of ground
fault in the substation, if the fault is close to the substation
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Fig. 5. Ground fault in the substation - results.
0
2000
4000
6000
8000
10000
12000
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
0,02 0,04 0,06 0,08 0,1 0,12 0,14 0,16 0,18 0,2
F a
u l
t   c
u r
r e
n t
  [ A
]
V o
l t a
g e
  [ V
]
Rtg Ω
V (negative conductors ‐ exposed conductive parts) V (rail) V (conventional limit) Fault current
Fig. 6. Ground fault along the line close to the substation - results.
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Fig. 7. Ground fault along the line far from the substation - results.
itself (fig. 6), as they are not limited by the ground resistance
Rsg . In case instead the fault is far from the substation, as
previously said, the resistance of the OCS strongly limits
the fault current. In particular in this case, there are again
situations in which the fault current is not big enough for being
recognized by the over-current protections, and dangerous
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Fig. 8. Fault current for a ground fault along the line.
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Fig. 9. Rail potential for a ground fault along the line.
voltages can last for a long time on the rails and inside the
substation between negative conductors and ECPs.
It is interesting to analyse the effect of the variation of the
two main parameters, Rtg and Rocs, at the same time, on the
fault current magnitude and on the rail potential, in case of
ground fault along the line.
Fig. 8 shows a 3D representation of the variation of the
fault current as a function of Rtg and Rocs. If we assume an
average setting of the over-current protection of 4000 A, the
circuit breaker will trip if the fault is in the lower (blue) area
of the 3D plot. For all the other combinations of Rtg and Rocs,
the circuit breaker will not detect the fault.
Fig. 9 presents instead a 3D representation of the variation
of the rail potential as a function of Rtg and Rocs. The 3D plot
shows that there is only a small portion of the variation range,
the lowest part, coloured in blue, where the rail potential is
below the safety limit of 120 V .
It is interesting, at this point, to put together the pieces
of information provided separately by fig. 8 and fig. 9. For
this purpose, the two colour plots, projected on the Rtg-Rocs
plane, are superimposed exploiting transparency. The result of
the combination of the two figures is presented in fig. 10.
By comparing the fault current magnitude with the setting of
the over-current protection and the rail potential with the safety
limit, it is possible to identify three different areas, highlighted
by the coloured borders in fig. 10:
• the small area at the top left, surrounded by the green
dotted line, where the over-current protection recognizes
the fault, where therefore the circuit-breaker trips, even
if no dangerous voltages are present because the rail
potential is below 120 V ;
• the area on the left, surrounded by the yellow dashed
line, where dangerous voltages are present because the
rail potential is above 120V and the circuit breaker trips
because the fault current is above the setting of the over-
current protection;
• the big area on the right, surrounded by the red solid line,
where the rail potential is above the safety limit, but the
circuit breaker will not trip, as the fault current is too
small to be detected by the over-current protection.
Analysing in particular the third area, the one surrounded
by the red solid line, it is clear that, in particular in case the
ground fault along the line happens far from the substation,
dangerous voltages can last for long periods on the rails, ac-
cessible to the public, without any tripping of the protections.
VI. CONCLUSION
If only over-current protections are adopted, in urban rail
traction systems potentially dangerous situations can be orig-
inated. In fact, the ground fault currents can be lower than
the protection settings, both for ground faults inside the
substations and for ground faults outside the substations, along
the line. In these cases dangerous voltages can last for a long
time on the rails, accessible to the public, and inside the
substations, on exposed conductive parts and between exposed
conductive parts and negative conductors. It is therefore of
utmost importance that innovative relays are installed and
properly set, in order to recognize short circuit currents from
normal operation ones.
The analysis that is presented in this paper has been
performed considering a negligible fault impedance. In case
the fault impedance is not negligible, the fault current could
be even smaller, and therefore more difficult to be detected by
common over-current protections.
One partial provision that could improve safety, even if not
totally sufficient, would be the installation of a voltage limiting
device, which connects the grounding system of the substation
with the negative conductors in case the voltage between them
is above a certain threshold. This provision would certainly be
beneficial for the ground fault in the substation, but would be
partially beneficial also for the ground fault along the line.
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